Democracy
Germany One Year After Elections: From “More Progress” to “Responsibility”
Germany’s “traffic-light coalition” reached the end of the road in December 2024 after then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for, and subsequently lost, a vote of confidence.
The tripartite government, formed in 2021 and comprising the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party and free-market oriented Free Democratic Party (FDP), aimed to bring a fresh perspective to German politics after 16 years of Angela Merkel’s “grand coalition” of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the SPD. The agreement that formed the basis for the Scholz government, “Dare to Make More Progress”, included ambitious goals for combatting climate change, fostering digital innovation and investing in the future. But plagued by ideological and geopolitical hurdles, particularly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the coalition was marked by infighting and occasional open hostility among the parties. The government collapsed after just three years, and nine months before the end of their mandate.
The snap elections that followed in February 2025 attracted the highest voter turnout since German reunification. The optimism felt in 2021, however, had largely dissipated, as Germans contended with a reemergence of war on the European continent and, domestically, a stagnating economy and a rise of far-right nationalism. The situation led voters to return to the tried and true, with the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), emerging as the winners with a combined 28.6% of the vote. To avoid a coalition with the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) or another unwieldy three-party arrangement, the CDU/CSU chose to form a government with the SPD, which assumed power three months later. The election results, which saw the AfD garner 20.8% of the vote, behind only the CDU/CSU, meant that centrist parties for the first time in postwar Germany failed to rank as the two most popular options. The uncomfortable reality that a right-wing, certified extremist party did so well added an additional layer of urgency to the coalition’s need to address the country’s challenges. The title of its governing agreement, “Responsibility for Germany”, reflected the seriousness of the moment.
One year after the election, and nearly 10 months into the new coalition’s term, the responsibilities continue to pile up. Russia’s war with Ukraine has entered its fifth year, energy prices and the cost of living remain high, backlash against asylum policy is mounting, antisemitism is on the rise and cuts to the social safety net are imminent. The government’s approach to these challenges is to reform the system writ large. Last year, Chancellor Friedrich Merz promised a wide-ranging “Autumn of Reforms” that included overhauling defense policy, health care and economic investment. What followed instead was gridlock, more infighting and controversial statements that mirrored more closely the previous coalition rather than the centrist stability of yesteryear.
The biggest sticking point has been reforming Germany’s social welfare state, the issue that reflects the most pronounced ideological gap between the center-right and center-left. The CDU/CSU wants to trim fat from Berlin’s bottom line by reducing benefits or ending government support for those it believes can and should work. This includes a proposal for Germans to shoulder the cost of their own dental coverage and end the option of part-time work as a “lifestyle choice”. In contrast, a strong social safety net is core to SPD values, which has led to the party’s support for expanding assistance for children and health care, and bolstering pensions. The last issue was so contentious that it nearly prevented the passage of the 2026 federal budget. Merz’s reputation as the “foreign policy chancellor”, seemingly more focused on issues outside of Germany, particularly the war in Ukraine, while Vice Chancellor and SPD co-leader Lars Klingbeil thrives on the domestic nitty-gritty, is also helping erode the government’s popularity.
Nevertheless, there have been areas of cohesion in the coalition, including compromising on pension policy, abolishing Germany’s debt brake to permit additional investment, improving national infrastructure and reforming immigration policy. A new area of convergence for Merz and Klingbeil has been their approach to the United States. A staunch transatlanticist, Merz had been until recently careful not to rile the Trump administration, while Klingbeil openly criticized Washington. The chancellor’s attitude has changed, however, going so far as to declare the end of an era of U.S. leadership during a speech at this year’s Munich Security Conference. The shift has prompted Merz to focus more on German and European capabilities as part of a long-term de-risking from the United States, a move that Klingbeil and many others in the SPD support.
The coalition may not be harmonious, but time has begun yielding consensus on major policy issues. This incremental progress, however, may be insufficient to counteract a burgeoning far-right wave at the national and local level. The AfD only barely trails (and occasionally leads) the CDU/CSU in polls ahead of five state elections this year. The results of these races will be bellwethers for the coalition, particularly in states where the CDU and SPD currently hold the reins of government. Merz acknowledged in a speech at a recent CDU party convention that change in Germany is taking longer than many had hoped, but he emphasized that his coalition is determined to execute its vision. The question will be if the electorate is willing to play the long game of moderate centrist successes while the far-right is knocking at their door.