Democracy at a Distance

The kingmakers of this year’s Romanian and Moldovan elections were not in Bucharest and Chisinau but lined up at consulates worldwide.

The electorates of both nations, after decades of large-scale emigration, have significant numbers of voters abroad. More than 14% of ballots cast in May in the second round of Romania’s presidential race were from outside the country. For Moldova’s September parliamentary election, more than 17% of voters were part of the diaspora.

In both campaigns, which were seen as bellwethers for the countries’ alignment with the EU and rejection of Russia-linked parties, diaspora voters had preferences that were significantly different from their compatriots back home. In the second round of the Romanian presidential race, far-right presidential candidate George Simion won 56% of the diaspora vote, compared to 45% of in-country voters. While Simion lost the second round overall, his strength in the diaspora rivaled his support in rural domestic regions where the far-right is strongest.

For Moldova’s election, the diaspora proved instrumental in the victory of the pro-EU PAS party. Crushing margins of over 78% of voters abroad brought the party’s total vote share to just over 50%. That allowed PAS to exclude the pro-Russia opposition from the new government, which will now be able to continue enacting needed reforms for EU membership.

For Romanians abroad, support for the far right is often a protest vote against traditional parties seen as corrupt and unwilling to deliver change. This is particularly true for Romanians in Western Europe, where many emigrants are younger and working class. They are often poor and face social marginalization in their adopted countries, but were still motivated to emigrate by limited economic opportunities back home. This double frustration, however, makes them fertile ground for anti-establishment messaging. Simion rose to prominence from social media campaigns targeted in part at diaspora communities, and he spent the final days before the election’s second round campaigning among them.

The considerations were different for the Moldovan diaspora, whose support for President Maia Sandu, her PAS and a 2024 referendum on joining the EU stems from frustration with perceived corruption and Russian influence under previous governments. A desire to cement democratic reforms and anti-corruption measures, and secure the country’s path to membership in the bloc, bolstered pro-EU sentiment among voters abroad. Leaning into those desires, Sandu held campaign events abroad and launched dedicated Facebook pages for PAS’s diaspora supporters.

Domestic actors, however, were not the only ones to recognize the importance of voters abroad. The recent elections in both countries were held amid allegations of Russian interference aimed at the diasporas in particular. In Romania’s case, this year’s vote came after the country’s Constitutional Court annulled an earlier first round of balloting in the presidential election held in 2024. That campaign took place amid claims of Kremlin efforts to propel another far-right candidate to victory, including via targeted online campaigns among the diaspora. In Moldova’s recent election, Moscow allegedly bankrolled vote-buying campaigns and influencers to spread disinformation within diaspora communities.

Targeting those communities for malign influence underscores their importance and recognizes competing priorities between voters at home and abroad. Pro-democracy actors need to recognize such nuances if they are to resist adversarial forces.

Diaspora voters, whether Romanian or Moldovan, will continue to represent a significant portion of the electorate and, therefore, wield power. At least 4 million Romanians, about one-fifth of the citizenry, live abroad, and 1.6 million of them voted from their adopted countries this year. More than a million Moldovans, approximately a third of that citizenry, are also estimated to live abroad, but fewer than 300,000 voted in their election this year. Out-migration continues from both countries, meaning the number of diaspora voters is likely to grow.

Integrating such massive segments of a population, especially when majorities of both diasporas want to eventually return home, is crucial for long-term democratic development and resilience. Both nations have far to go in this area. Romania has the second-lowest score among EU countries on the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index, while Moldova performs only slightly better.

Diaspora engagement strategies from PAS and, ironically, Simion’s far-right AUR party could provide blueprints for building relationships with Moldovan and Romanian voters abroad, despite their opposing political orientations. But this must be complemented by giving diaspora representatives a say in policymaking decisions if satisfaction with democracy and trust in its institutions is to be boosted, and disinformation countered. An inclusive democratization process does not stop at national borders.

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