Meddle Meets Mettle

At first glance, the recent elections in Hungary and Slovenia had little in common. The former was widely regarded as a high-stakes moment for the future of Hungarian democracy and the unity of the EU; the latter represented a rather routine exercise of democratic choice.

Yet, with each country’s election contending with distinct forms of interference, both are emerging as test cases for the recently published European Democracy Shield (EDS).

On November 12, 2025, the European Commission presented the EDS, which pursues three main objectives: protecting the European Union (EU) from information manipulation and disinformation, safeguarding democratic institutions like elections against malign foreign interference, and reinforcing broader societal resilience. Central to the implementation of the EDS is the establishment of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience (ECDR), which is intended to serve as a coordinating hub for these EU-wide efforts.

However, since the publication of the EDS, questions have emerged about whether it would be robust enough to address the rapidly evolving nature of threats. The primary concern is its overt focus on foreign disinformation campaigns above other priorities. This lack of balance risks obscuring other ways in which malign actors undermine democratic processes in the EU. The Hungarian and Slovenian elections serve as a sobering reminder of the complexity and variability of threats to European democracy; the EDS’s mettle may not be enough to meet such meddling.

Hungary: Threats Old and New

On April 12, Viktor Orbán’s 16-year tenure as Hungarian prime minister came to an end as the new Tisza party won a two-thirds majority of seats in parliament. In the lead-up to the Hungarian election, the stakes were clear: The country attracted attention from international media and foreign politicians alike. In an unprecedented move, U.S. Vice President JD Vance flew to Budapest just days before the election to express support for Orbán, a close ally of President Donald Trump. This came just weeks after Secretary of State Marco Rubio took a similar trip. While the visits were not enough to stop Orbán’s defeat, the tide of U.S. political figures campaigning in European elections represented a startling new development in transatlantic democratic norms.

Simultaneously, a more traditional form of foreign involvement was unfolding in the country. On April 5, Orbán announced that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had informed him of a large amount of explosives found near a Russian natural gas pipeline passing through both countries. The claims were quickly positioned as a false-flag operation by opposition figures, including Peter Magyar. This is due to previous rumors that Orbán would point to plots against pipelines as evidence of Ukrainian interference on behalf of Magyar. No evidence of the alleged plot has been released.

Slovenia: New Actors Join the Fray

Unlike the Hungarian election, the Slovenian parliamentary elections (held March 22) attracted little foreign media attention. The results in Slovenia were not seen as consequential for the future of the EU, despite the strong chances of Janez Janša, leader of the right-wing Slovenian Democratic Party and known ally of Orbán, returning and disrupting the European Council’s decision-making. This sense of relative calm changed following a series of anonymously leaked videos.

In the week leading up to the elections, a then-unknown source released secretly recorded conversations with political figures tied to the government. The videos targeted the incumbent coalition government by exposing alleged corrupt practices among its top officials. The timing and the lack of attribution immediately raised concerns of deliberate interference to influence the election results.

Since then, the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) has confirmed the videos were a product of foreign interference. SOVA identified a foreign non-state actor, the Israeli company Black Cube, as being behind the operation, allegedly in cooperation with a domestic political actor. While it’s difficult to measure the impact of these videos on the election results, the incident is a poignant example of the threats to election security and integrity that the EU and its member states face.

Turning the Shield into a Fort

The recent elections in Slovenia and Hungary illustrate the often-blurred line that exists between external and internal pressures on democratic processes. In Slovenia, a local political party allegedly worked with a foreign private company to secretly record and release videos to influence the elections. In Hungary, direct campaigning from major U.S. political figures was organized to bolster support for the incumbent, far-right Fidesz party. For the EDS to be effective in such a threatening landscape, these dynamics must be considered.

Currently, the EDS’ narrow focus on external threats is reflected in the EU-level work on interference. For example, the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield has held an exchange of views only on recent elections in Bulgaria, where there was alleged interference resembling Russian state-sponsored operatives. Hungary and Slovenia, however, have remained absent from the Committee’s conversations. That is despite the former Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob urging the European institutions for an investigation. Such calls should not be left unanswered if the EU wants to strengthen its collective approach against election interference.

Furthermore, the envisaged ECDR’s opt-in model for member states renders the hub relatively toothless. This is particularly true given the clear evidence that European actors can collaborate with foreign entities in election interference. The Slovenian party that allegedly worked with Black Cube, for example, will now manage the country’s participation in the Centre’s work. For the Centre to successfully serve as a coordination hub, it needs clear responsibilities and the capacity to act, as called for by the European Parliament. This approach is not without precedent: the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has demonstrated that the EU is capable of enhanced cooperation among member states to address shared challenges more effectively.

The EU’s limited competence over democracy means that the success of the EDS depends on member states’ backing. Just as European hard security is now perceived to be under threat and the EU member states are jointly investing in their defense, the same ambitions and resolve are needed to safeguard European democracy. The upcoming Irish Presidency of the EU Council and negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework are both opportunities for member states to back the EDS and the ECDR with comprehensive funding and a clear-eyed mandate. Only with such fortification will the Shield be able to withstand the blows.

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