Open Debate and Unlikely Bedfellows

In his first campaign to become chairman of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in 2018, Friedrich Merz, now Chancellor of Germany, made two promises: get his party back up to 40% of the national vote share and halve support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). Merz lost the election, and neither of his party predictions came to fruition. The AfD is currently the most popular party in Germany, while the CDU continues to fall behind.

Support for the AfD has nearly doubled from 14% in 2018 to 27% today, eclipsing the CDU’s 23% polling rate. At the state level, backing for the AfD has grown exponentially, particularly in the former East Germany. Across the five states that make up the previously Communist-controlled bloc, the AfD is polling at nearly 39% on average. Two of these states, Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, will have elections in September. If the AfD’s commanding polling lead translates to votes, a far-right government could take power in Germany for the first time since 1945.

Rising dissatisfaction, lack of party loyalty and dissolving institutional trust has created fertile ground for radical change in Germany, with the CDU as the AfD’s only viable challenger in both elections. In Saxony-Anhalt, where there is a higher likelihood of the AfD garnering enough of the vote share to govern alone, the CDU is striving to rapidly gain voter trust and demonstrate its political capabilities. The roadmap for success may not be found in Berlin, but rather in neighboring Thuringia. The CDU there has led an ideologically disparate, but functionally stable, coalition for nearly two years, while the AfD remains in the opposition. Through open dialogue and consensus building, the CDU in Thuringia has created a blueprint for other states looking to mitigate the far-right’s impact.

Constitutional Concerns amid Potential AfD Power Grab

Support for the AfD, particularly in the East, is kindling a political crisis on two levels. The first—and more pressing of the two—is the significance of a German state government ruled by a party with five state-level chapters deemed “certified right-wing extremist”, and four others a “suspected case of right-wing extremism”. The AfD is projected to be the largest party in both Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, with a chance of achieving an absolute majority in the former. Groundwork is actively being laid for an AfD-led government in each state, which would include overhauling the education system, stripping funding for arts and culture, and reorganizing the bureaucracy, all to further the party’s aims. While guardrails are in place to both prevent the dismissal of civil servants on ideological grounds and uphold federally mandated educational standards, the AfD has myriad opportunities to shape the state apparatus in its own image. However, if the federal government perceives that state-level actors are inhibiting national laws and obligations, it has the right to enact Article 37 of Germany’s Basic Law, the Bundeszwang, or “federal coercion instrument”. This gives the federal government the authority to force a state to fulfill its obligations by withholding funding or sending federal representatives to oversee state governance. The government has never deployed Article 37. To do so would likely be deeply unpopular, particularly in the East where fears of federal overreach remain high after decades of a repressive socialist regime. Therefore, taking such a drastic step to curb the AfD’s influence could have the unintended effect of garnering even more sympathy for the party.

Loss of Trust and Sinking Satisfaction

The second pillar of this dilemma, a loss of trust in mainstream parties and institutions, is a major reason why voters are turning to the AfD across the country. In the 13 years since its founding, the AfD has capitalized on wedge issues dividing German society. What began as an anti-Euro party has morphed into a catch-all for discontent, be it against current policies on defense, climate, the economy, and—most centrally—migration. Only 12% of Germans are reportedly satisfied with the CDU-led coalition at the federal level, while just 16% are satisfied with Merz as chancellor. As voters become frustrated with government gridlock and cuts to social spending, while promises of reform remain far on the horizon, they are increasingly finding a home with the AfD.

A survey conducted by public broadcaster ARD found that 60% of respondents believe AfD support is primarily driven by disappointment in the politics of other parties. Of that 60%, 39% identified as AfD voters. This shift, however, is not permanent: 69% of respondents, 49% of whom identified as AfD voters, predict the AfD’s strength will decrease when the federal government makes tangible progress in key political areas. That is good news for the CDU and other mainstream parties. But as constituent trust continues to fall amid the government’s handling of the economy, social welfare and migration policies, this theory may not be tested anytime soon.

A lack of trust and dissatisfaction with the status quo is also driving AfD support in Saxony-Anhalt, where the party is polling at 42%. Satisfaction with the current state government, also led by the CDU, is at just 33%, the second-lowest in the country. Only 11% of AfD voters view the coalition’s work positively, compared to 72% of CDU-affiliated respondents. Across political lines, uncertainty on the global stage impacts the outlook at home: a mere 13% of respondents in Saxony-Anhalt viewed the current state of affairs positively, and 79% expressed concern. Among AfD supporters, the situation landed as particularly bleak—86% cited concerns about their current situation, and only 8% expressed confidence. This pessimism is reflected in an overall lack of trust in political institutions by AfD supporters, of whom just 3% believe that the state will fulfill its duties to constituents.

The CDU’s Path Forward through Thuringia

While the CDU’s handling of the AfD at the federal level has recently devolved into incendiary pamphlets and viral TikTok videos, there is a practical example for the party in Saxony-Anhalt to follow at the state level—a path paved by its neighbor, Thuringia. The leader of the AfD in Thuringia, Bjorn Höcke, is one of the party’s most effective—and infamous—figures. During the most recent state election in 2024, the AfD netted 33% of the vote and became the most popular party, compared to 24% for the CDU. Nonetheless, a tripartite government of the CDU, center-left SPD, and left-conservative BSW was formed, an unlikely constellation spanning the political spectrum that has held steady for nearly two years.

There are two things the CDU has done well in Thuringia that curbed the initial influence of the AfD and allowed the party to lead its politically-diverse coalition. The first was organizing a televised debate between the AfD lead candidate, Höcke, and the CDU lead candidate (and current Minister-President), Mario Voigt several months before the election. The debate was controversial. Some criticized the decision to give a designated far-right extremist such a large platform, while others argued that challenging the AfD through open dialogue was the only way to gain voter trust. There was also concern about the personalities of the men on stage: Höcke is used to conducting large rallies and enrapturing audiences, while Voigt leaned less on personal charm and more on policy platforms during his time on the campaign trail.

Ultimately, Voigt’s calm, fact-based approach is what won the debate. When Höcke brought up emotional issues or rhetorical themes, Voigt acknowledged the problem, refuted Höcke’s interpretation and then provided a clear roadmap for how the CDU would handle it. Voigt also earned points with the hometown crowd when, as a native of Thuringia, he corrected Höcke’s use of a food term not local to the area. While risky, the strategy to engage the AfD in a principled, policy-oriented manner was a success for Voigt and the CDU. In the month following the debate, the CDU received a 3% bump in the polls, coupled with a 2% loss for the AfD.

Once the new government was formed in Thuringia, the CDU found itself in a coalition with one long-standing partner in the SPD, and one ideologically disparate one in the BSW. The BSW is a Russia-friendly, economically left-wing, socially conservative party formed in early 2024. In nearby Brandenburg, the coalition between SPD and BSW collapsed in early 2026 due to irreconcilable differences, leaving Thuringia as the only state where this experiment has continued. The CDU has navigated this sometimes-uneasy truce by identifying areas of common ground and acknowledging differences, rather than attempting to force a common line.

One notable example of success is the implementation of a citizens’ assembly program, a forum for Thuringians to discuss issues and make recommendations to the state government. For the initial phase, 200 individuals have been chosen from 36 communities across the state. Citizens’ assemblies were a core priority of the BSW, and the CDU has leaned in and designated the project as essential to the entire coalition. The CDU’s support has likely made the initiative easier to fund and implement, making it a policy win for the BSW, a show of unity by the CDU, and good press for the coalition all around.

Stability, however, should not be confused with satisfaction, and the coalition in Thuringia is not without its issues. Recent survey results indicate that 64% of Thuringians do not feel represented by the state government, with the highest amount of dissatisfaction among AfD voters. This suggests that voter support is not a long-term guarantee, unless the coalition can produce tangible policy victories. Nonetheless, the CDU’s ability to stave off the AfD at the polls and provide a stable alternative is a victory in and of itself, and should be the benchmark for the party in Saxony-Anhalt. Leaning into facts over fanfare, recruiting a coalition of the willing, and—most importantly—demonstrating a clear, empathetic plan that values constituents is the only chance for the CDU to turn the tide against a far-right wave come September.

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