Politics & Society
The Stakes of Stability
Electoral Reform in Italy
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s year did not go as expected.
In March, she championed a referendum that would have reformed the judicial system. Voters handily rejected it following criticism that it would concentrate too much power in the hands of the government. In July, Meloni suffered a surprise 188–187 defeat on an electoral reform package meant to take effect before next year’s parliamentary elections. The vote, cast via secret ballot, indicated that many within Meloni’s own coalition had defected on the measure.
Now, she may have finally notched a win. An amended, more expansive version of the electoral reform that failed in July has passed in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. As a result, Italy will shift to a fully proportional electoral system instead of the previous mixed system, under which one-third of deputies were still elected from first-past-the-post–based districts. Other new measures include a 3 percent threshold for single parties (10 percent for coalitions) to obtain seats and a requirement for parties or coalitions to name their candidate for prime minister prior to the election. The most impactful—and most controversial—reform in the package is the “majority prize.” Under the new rules, the first-place coalition will receive a bonus of 70 seats in the Chamber and 35 in the Senate if it reaches 42 percent of the vote in both houses, guaranteeing a majority.
Italy is no stranger to electoral reform; the new law is its sixth since 1993. For this latest package, Meloni expended considerable political capital, going so far as to stake her premiership on it. She stated that another defeat for the measures might have led her to resign, reflecting the importance of the electoral changes for Italy’s longest-serving post-war government. Their approval will mean major shifts for next year’s elections.
Meloni and her partners have christened the reforms the “Stabilicum,” meant to make governing simpler in a country where governments frequently fall apart. Her critics, though, are fierce. Members of the center-left opposition, numerous academics, and some jurists have heavily criticized the reforms as anti-democratic, particularly the majority prize. The opposition plans to file at least 30 lawsuits challenging the law by October 26, with many of their arguments hinging on the argument that the majority prize makes the legislature less accountable. How the legal battles will play out remains unclear.
If the law remains in effect for Italy’s next elections, which are expected as soon as May, their potential impact remains hazy. Meloni initially pushed the reforms at a time when her coalition’s dominance was clear, and her support easily passed the 42 percent majority prize threshold. Today, she risks her own law backfiring. Recent polling shows the center-left alliance surpassing that threshold, while leaving Meloni just under it. Compounding Meloni’s losses is a new far-right force outside of her right-wing alliance: former General Roberto Vannacci’s National Future (FN). Vannacci was suspended from his army position in 2023 after self-publishing a book that disparaged immigrants, ethnic minorities, LGBT+ people, and women, among others. After being elected to the European Parliament as part of the far-right Lega party, a coalition partner of Meloni’s, he left Lega and founded FN in 2026. Now, FN is challenging Meloni’s coalition from the right, reaching 8 percent in polls as of mid-October.
Meloni could opt to include Vannacci in her coalition, a strategy that recent surveys predict would help her win the elections thanks to the majority prize. However, doing so risks alienating the more moderate center-right voters, who still represent an important part of her coalition. At the same time, the center-left may face a bruising struggle over the requirement to name a prime minister candidate and a platform prior to the election. Debate is already raging over whether to hold primary elections to choose a candidate. Both coalitions have clear paths to satisfy the 42 percent threshold, though if both fall below it, then the majority prize is moot. Further, the political volatility confronting both coalitions adds a layer of irony to the “Stabilicum” moniker.
Many unanswered questions remain about Italy’s new electoral system. However, it is unquestionable that, if the law remains in place, Rome will be subject to a major upheaval of governance. While ostensibly aimed at ensuring stability, the law adds new points of contention to the pre-election period, as shown by the center-left’s infighting and Meloni’s discord with Vannacci’s FN. Most concerningly, the law also raises major risks for democratic accountability. The majority prize could insulate minority governments from parliamentary negotiations, which would hand them substantial power over legislation, appointments, and oversight without a corresponding electoral mandate. Meloni choosing to introduce the law when her coalition was above the majority prize threshold in polls, but below an outright majority, does little to dispel these worries, given her history of supporting democratic backsliding. A potential coalition with Vannacci further underscores these concerns. Meloni contends that the “Stabilicum” will safeguard against political turmoil and strengthen future governments. The most critical outstanding question for the reform, though, is whether Italy’s democracy will weaken in return.